The 1997 Bolivian election in historical perspective by Dunkerley, James
University of London 
Institute of Latin American Studies 
Occasional Papers No. 16 
THE 1997 BOLIVIAN 
ELECTION IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
James Dunkerley 
Institute of Latin American Studies 
31 Tavistock Square 
London WC1H 9HA 
The Institute of Latin American Studies publishes as Occasional Papers selected 
seminar and conference papers and public lectures delivered at the Institute or 
by scholars associated with the work of the Institute. 
James Dunkerley is Professor of Politics at the Institute of Latin American 
Studies and Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London. 
Occasional Papers, New Series 1992-
ISSN 0953 6825 
© Institute of Latin American Studies 
University of London 1998 
THE 1997 BOLIVIAN ELECTION IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
By James Dunkerley 
The poll of 1 June 1997 in Bolivia might, perhaps, be thought outstanding only 
for its result - the constitutional election to the presidency of a man, General 
Hugo Banzer Suarez, who had taken that office by bloody coup 26 years earlier 
and held it for seven years as a dictator. Yet Banzer's election and the strong 
position of his party, Accion Democratica Nacionalista (ADN), in the 
congressional poll and its subsequent formation of a 4megacoalicion' 
(ADN/CONDEPA/MIR/UCS) may be seen as expressions of a wider 
'consolidation' of the institutions of liberal democracy in Bolivia, marking an 
important shift away from the post-war pattern of corporatist politics 'by 
ultimatum'.1 That pattern had reached its peak in 1980-85 with, first, the 
anarchic and drug-related dictatorship of General Luis Garcia Mesa (1980-81) 
and, then, the weak constitutional administration of the Union Democratica y 
Popular (UDP, 1982-85), which fell prey to syndicalist and radical demands 
which it could neither meet nor suppress. The poll in 1997 was the fourth 
national election to be held according to constitutional order since 1985, when 
the UDP had been obliged to leave office a year early. As a result, the election 
could be said to confirm a new pattern of political behaviour whereby 
conservative and populist forces negotiate electoral and administrative pacts and 
coalitions without facing stringent constraints from other domestic political 
forces. Yet neither Banzer nor his several allies in the 'megacoalicion ' which 
took office in August 1997 were extravagant in their celebration or claims of 
achievement - a sobriety echoed by most commentators, if not the university 
trotskyists who cosily issued a call for armed insurrection to oust 'the fascists' 
from power. 
That call to arms jarred particularly in the context of the exhumation of the 
remains of Ernesto Che Guevara and six of his guerrilla comrades to be returned 
to Cuba on 12 July 1997, just a few weeks short of the thirtieth anniversary of 
their execution. The youth of the contemporary radical left seemed blind to the 
popular rejection of the politics of violence, despite a dozen years of strict 
neoliberal policies, fiscal parsimony, and only modest success in reforming a 
centralised and patrimonialist state, in which corruption was widespread, if not 
endemic. Indeed, the smooth operation of the election and the lack of conflict 
1 I have discussed this pattern in Rebellion in the Veins. Political Struggle in Bolivia, 
1952-1982 (London: Verso, 1984) and Political Transition and Economic Stabilisation: 
Bolivia, 1982-1989 (Research Paper no. 22, Institute of Latin American Studies, 
University of London, 1990). 
attending both its result and Banzer's inauguration is all the more remarkable 
given the instability and violence that had prevailed for several years previously 
in neighbouring Peru and the fact that Bolivia's own indigenous communities 
have never been properly included within the culture or institutions of a liberal 
state which still exhibits a marked racism. Although no administration since 
1985 has been able to avoid suspending the Constitution under states of siege, in 
order to restrict popular protests at the high social cost of deflation, those 
mobilisations have not endured or grown. No serious guerrilla force has taken 
root since the days of Guevara, the once powerful trade union confederation 
(Central Obrera Boliviana, COB) is divided and disoriented, and the legal left is 
but a shadow of its former self. Taken together with Banzer's past and the high 
profile of entrepreneurs in his government, this scenario would seem to suggest 
an uncomplicated victory of the right, but that victory is certainly complicated, 
in terms of ideology as well as institutions. 
The Electoral System 
Elections have been held intermittently in Bolivia since the 1840s, but they did 
not become meaningful in terms of the competitive allocation of office until the 
1880s, and the urban masses only became actively engaged in the holding of 
polls from the 1920s. During the 1930s and 1940s military governments 
subordinated - but did not entirely eliminate - electoral contests, which could 
still affect local structures of power and influence in the towns and mines.2 
However, the restriction of the vote to those who could read and write 
effectively disenfranchised the rural population, which accounted for the great 
majority of the inhabitants of the Republic. As can be seen from Table 1, the 
election of May 1951 - the last before the revolution of April 1952 - excited the 
active participation of less than 130,000 people: a 38 per cent abstention rate by 
registered voters when these constituted a tiny segment of the total population. 
This level of participation was in keeping with a social system in which 
urban trams hauled platforms behind them on which to carry those wearing 
indigenous dress, and in which free personal service of a servile nature was still 
common on the manorial estates of the Andean altiplano and valleys. The extent 
to which the 1952 revolution altered the 'formal political nation' can also be 
seen from Table 2, which shows the geographical distribution of the electorate 
following the introduction of universal suffrage by the Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionario (MNR) when it took power through the revolution. (Table 2 also 
shows the decline by the 1990s of the old mining and agricultural centres in the 
southern Andean region of the country and the contemporary concentration of 
social power in the triangle of La Paz-Cochabamba-Santa Cruz). 
2 See, for example, Laurence Whitehead (1981), 'Miners as voters: the electoral process 
in Bolivia's mining camps', Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 313-
46. 
Table 1 
Electoral Participation, 1951-89 
1951 3,019,031 204,649 126,123 38.4 
1956 3,250,000 1,119,047 955,349 14.6 
1966 3,748,000 1,270,611 1,099,994 13.4 
1978 4,850,000 1,922,556 1,971,968 +2.6 
1979 5,253,623 1,876,920 1,693,233 9.8 
1980 5,570,109 2,525,000 2,004,284 1,489,484 25.9 
1985 6,429,226 2,931,123 2,108,457 1,728,365 18.0 
1989 7,125,000 3,191,000 2,136,560 1,573,790 26.3 
Source: J. Lazarte, Revista de Estudios Politicos, no. 74, Oct.-Dec. 1991. Annex. 3 
Table 2 
Eligible Voters by Department, 1951-97 
La Paz 72,512 260,443 436,049 1,068,900 
Cochabamba 36,834 203,407 270,622 527,100 
Santa Cruz 25,981 94,940 138,236 733,600 
Chuquisaca 15,233 57,002 97,434 196,700 
Oruro 26,116 62,485 79,057 172,200 
Potosi 41,161 125,059 151,074 251,800 
Tarija 16,281 29,563 44,406 157,400 
Beni 10,093 15,385 40,474 132,800 
Pando 2,009 3,046 8,408 19,200 
Total 246,220 829,556 1,265,754 3,260,100 
Source: C.Mesa, Entre Urnas y Fusiles\ Corte Nacional Electoral. 
Although the first poll under universal suffrage - that of 1956 - may be used 
as a point of comparison for voter eligibility and participation, it scarcely offers 
us a useful, or even valid, reference point in comparing precise results or party 
performance. The same may be said of the elections of 1960 and 1964, which 
were similarly held under the revolutionary hegemony of the MNR, when 
competition was far from free and fair. This was particularly true in 1964, with 
the party splitting internally at the same time as it won a proportion of the vote 
almost on a Soviet scale (see Table 3). 
Pop, Potential Voters Kci»/d Votes Cast Abs. 
Department 1951 1956 1966 1997 
Yet, just as the victory of the British Labour party in May 1997 cannot 
usefully be compared with any poll prior to that of 1929 if both participation 
and results are taken as variables, so in Bolivia not a single poll before 1979 -
15 years after the collapse of the MNR's 'National Revolution' - properly 
stands the test of comparison. This is because the succession of military regimes 
that followed the MNR (see Table 4) either excluded the opposition and sharply 
restricted election campaigns (as in 1966) or simply fixed the results (as in 1978, 
a fact clearly shown by the 'excess voters' identified in Table 1). Nonetheless, in 
both 1979 and 1980 the MNR still retained the support of a considerable sector 
of the population, albeit at a level well short of a majority or one allowing the 
formation of a single-party administration (Table 3). Moreover, given that at the 
time of the polls of 1979 and 1980 the UDP was still strongly identified with the 
left-wing of the MNR, one could argue that the revolutionary party of the 1950s 
continued to enjoy an 'historical primacy' but was no longer able to translate 
this into coherent ideological advantage or electoral victory. This, however, is 
something of an theoretical observation since the coups staged in 1979 and 1980 
overthrew the election results of those years. 
Table 3 
'Pre-Transition' Election Results 
(% vote; major parties only) 
MNR 42.9 82.3 74.5 85.9 10.8 31.1 20.2 
ASD 32.1 
FSB 10.5 13.7 8.0 _ 12.5 
PL 5.2 
PIR 5.3 
MNRA 14.1 8.6 
FRB 61.6 
PDC 8.5 
UDP 24.6 31.2 38.7 
ADN 12.9 16.8 
PS-1 4.2 8.7 
Blank 1.5 1.2 5.7 5.8 1.8 3.2 11.2 
Null 1.1 1.2 6.5 2.4 0.9 10.0 6.3 
Sources: Mesa; Corte Nacional Electoral. 
As a consequence of those interventions and the dictatorships they set up we 
cannot talk of any election before 1985 being 'fully democratic' in the combined 
terms of participation, free competition, fair result and full social acceptance of 
that result. For this reason I have identified all earlier elections as 'pre-
transition'. The watershed is certainly partial in terms of popular participation 
and party competition, but it is important when these are taken within the context 
of institutional continuity. One could certainly argue that the transition begins 
1951 1956 1960 1964 1966 1978 ! 1979 1980 
before 1985 - for instance, with Banzer's overthrow in 1978 - but it is only at 
that point that the transition became a profound process. Equally, one may wish 
to describe the position prevailing in 1997 less as 'democratic' than as 
'polyarchic' on the grounds that there has not yet been a transformation from 
institutional continuity to a culture and popular expectation of pluralist 
behaviour within civil and political society.3 
Table 4 
Bolivian Governments, 1951-85 
M. Urriolagoitia (PURS) 
H. Ballivian (military) 
V. Paz Estenssoro (MNR) 
H. Siles Zuazo (MNR) 
V. Paz Estenssoro (MNR) 
V. Paz Estenssoro (MNR) 
R. Barrientos (military) 
L. Siles Salinas (PDC) 
A. Ovando (military) 
J.J. Torres (military) 
H. Banzer (military) 
J. Pereda (military) 
D. Padilla (military) 
W. Guevara (PRA/MNR) 
A. Natusch Busch (military) 
L. Gueiler (PRIN/MNR) 
L. Garcia Mesa (military) 
Military Junta 
C. Torrelio (military) 
G. Vildoso (military) 
H. Siles Zuazo (UDP/MNRI) 
Within this evolution the poll of 1997 incorporated the result of disparate 
efforts to settle on electoral arrangements which would prove socially fair as 
well as institutionally efficient. To some degree, as in 1986 and 1991, changes in 
electoral law were the outcome of pragmatic - even opportunist - political trade-
offs; these should not be treated as emanating from disinterested 'statecraft'. On 
the other hand, the electoral system put in place over the three years before the 
1997 poll was generally the consequence of informed debate over constitutional 
reform and the relative merits of 'presidentialist' and 'parliamentary' political 
systems in the post-authoritarian era. Although the MNR had firm control over 
the executive and legislature, there was broad agreement that the electoral 
3 Robert A. Dahl (1971) Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale 
University Press); Laurence Whitehead (1986) 'Bolivia's Failed Democratisation, 1977-
80', in G. O'Donnell, P. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (eds.) Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press). 
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changes it introduced would address the difficulties of the proportional 
representation systems previously used: up until 1986, the D'Hondt formula, 
which could reward a party that won less than 1.5 per cent of the vote with up to 
three seats in the 130-strong lower house; thereafter, the St Laigue system, more 
favourable to larger political formations. The new system is very similar to that 
currently used in Germany and known in Europe as the 'additional member' 
mechanism, whereby half the deputies are elected from a party list 
('plurinominal') and half as individual candidates for constituencies 
('uninominal'). Under the law of 2 August 1996, article 60 of the Constitution 
was amended to divide Bolivia's 424,000 square kilometres - slightly less than 
the size of France, Germany and Great Britain combined - into 68 constituencies 
in an effort to match rising localist sentiment, to curb some of the patronage 
power of the central party apparatchiks, and to enhance constituency affiliation 
and responsiveness as a factor in parliamentary behaviour. 
Table 5 
National Elections, 1985-97: Vote 
MNR 456,704 (26.4%) 363,113 (23.1%) 585,837 (36%) 396,235 (18.2%) 
AP 
ADN 493,735 (28.6%) 357,298 (22.7%) 
346,865 (21%) 
485,705 (22.3%) 
MIR 153,143 (8.9%) 309,033 (19.6%) 365,005 (16.8%) 
CONDEPA 173,459(11.2%) 235.427 (14%) 373,528 (17.2%) 
UCS 226,826(14%) 350,730(16.1%) 
MBL 88,260 (5%) 67,244 (3.1%) 
IU 10,072 (0.7%) 113,509 (7.2%) 16,137 (0.9%) 80,806 (3.7%) 
PS-1 38,786 (2.2%) 39,763 (2.8%) 
Total 1,728,363 1,573,790 1,731,309 2.177,171 
Sitting: Siles (UDP) V.Paz (MNR) J.Paz (AP/MIR) Sanchez (MNR) 
Elected: V.Paz (94) J.Paz (97) Sanchez (97) i Banzer 
Loser: Banzer (51) Sanchez(50) Palenque(16) (unopposed) 
Pact/Coal.: MNR/AND MIR/AND MNR/MBL/UCS 'Megacoaliciorv 
Note - Figures in brackets after names of elected and losing candidates refer to the number of votes 
cast in Congress for each candidate in the vote for the presidency. 
As can be seen from Tables 5 and 6, this new system did not greatly alter the 
result of the poll in terms of the pattern of the vote from 1985 onwards (the 1997 
results given in Table 5 are those for the plurinominal vote, which enables 
comparison with earlier polls). However, as an individual variable for the 
allocation of seats it was of some consequence (Table 7) since it enabled 
uninominal candidates of more regionally focused parties, such as CONDEPA 
Party/Front 1985 1989 1993 1997 
in La Paz, to benefit from the strength of their slate as well as permitting 
celebrated individuals to buck the weakness of any party slate with which they 
were attached (Juan del Granado, the prosecutor of General Garcia Mesa in La 
Paz for the MBL, Evo Morales, the leader of the coca growers' movement for 
IU in Cochabamba). Table 8 shows the geographical distribution of the 
plurinominal vote for the different parties. 
Table 6 
Elections, 1985-97: Seats 
(130 deputies; 27 senators) 
MNR 59 49 69 30 
ADN 51 46 43 
AP (MIR/ADN) 43 
MIR 16 41 30 
UCS 21 23 
CONDEPA 10 14 22 
MBL 5 
PS-1 5 
IU 11 4 
Eje 1 
Arbol 1 
Others 26 1 
Source: Corte Nacional Electoral 
This new, two-tier system operated with remarkable smoothness on polling 
day, the large majority of the electorate completing both the plurinominal upper-
half of the ballot-paper for president, senators and slate-based deputies as well 
as the lower uninominal section. The efficient logistical preparation of the poll 
was notable, including the allocation of a mobile phone to urban electoral 
stations and extensive distribution of clear preparatory guides to the new system. 
It is, however, hard to comment with authority on the degree of 'tactical voting' 
indulged in by the electorate. In part this is because the system was completely 
untried in 1997, and in part it derives from the fact that the voters were generally 
aware that since the 1960s no single party had won the 50 per cent of the vote 
required by the Constitution to enable it to take power directly. Consequently, as 
stipulated by the Constitution, the new Congress would elect the president from 
the front-runners, thereby placing a premium on the pre- and post-election pacts 
that will be discussed shortly. In 1997 there was a general anti-MNR sentiment 
amongst the populist and conservative parties as well as on the left, but there 
was no pre-poll public agreement to form a coalition. As a result, the electorate 
could reasonably vote against the MNR in the expectation that this would 
Par ty /Front 1985 1989 1993 1997 
probably change the government but not necessarily to the advantage of their 
preferred party, even if they voted for slate- and constituency-based candidates 
from the same organisation. Equally, it should be noted that the composition of 
the Senate is calculated by yet another system, by which the winning party takes 
two of the three seats for each of the country's nine departments and the second-
runner receives the remaining one. It defies belief that even the most 
psephologically sophisticated electorate could have calculated the probabilities 
of these three routes to the legislature (congressional plurinominal, 
congressional uninominal, senatorial) in addition to those of undeclared post-
poll pacts whilst retaining the option of delivering a 'voto de castigo' against the 
incumbent regime and, perhaps, reserving a separate vote for a favoured 
individual. In sum, it seems reasonable to suggest that the electorate simply 
voted according to general experience and proclivity with its calculations being 
no more detailed than those allowed by a broad estimation of the popularity of 
the alternatives. 
Table 7 
CONDEPA/MBL/IU: Slate and Constituency votes 
La Paz Pi. 289,175 13,146 9,113 
uni. 228,086 38,969 11,430 
Santa Cruz Pi. 11,233 12,170 2,521 
uni. 9,915 24,328 873 
Chuquisaca Pi. 12,249 16,378 2,257 
uni. 6,870 23,759 5,869 
Cochabamba Pi. 13,115 8,155 59,036 
uni. 9,164 12,087 54,416 
Oruro Pi. 24,596 1,987 960 
uni. 18,257 5,277 3,214 
Potosi Pi. 17,706 8,258 3,864 
uni. 12,489 11,427 3,733 
Tarija Pi. 3,774 4,503 655 
uni. 2,933 11,185 585 
Beni Pi. 1,321 2,196 134 
uni. 1,167 2,572 879 
Pando Pi. 359 451 55 
uni. 957 491 2 
Source: Corte Nacional Electoral 
t CONDEPA MBL IU 
Table 8 
1997 Presidential Election (% slate vote by Department) 
(not rounded) 
La Paz 1.9 1.8 0.6 0.4 
Santa Cruz 1.9 0.4 1.5 0.4 0.6 
Beni 2.3 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Pando 2.8 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 
Oruro 1.7 1.8 1.8 0.5 0.4 
Potosi 3.6 2.1 1.0 2.9 0.5 
Cochabamba 2.2 15.9 1.0 0.4 0.6 
Chuquisaca 9.5 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.4 
Tarija 3.7 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.1 
National 3.1 3.7 1.4 0.8 0.5 
ADN - Accion Democratica Nacionalista; CONDEPA - Conciencia de 
Patria; Eje Pachakuti; IU - Izquierda Unida; MBL - Movimiento Bolivia 
Libre; MIR - Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria; MNR -
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario; PDB - Partido Democr£tico 
Boliviano; UCS - Uni6n Cfvica de Solidaridad; VS - Vanguardia 
Socialista. 
Source: Corte Nacional Electoral 
Two other changes in the system deserve mention and may yet acquire more 
than formal importance. The first is the extension of the presidential term from 
four to five years. This is in keeping with a general Latin American pattern of 
extending executive mandates, either in themselves or - most recently and 
controversially in Peru and Argentina - by enabling the serving of successive 
terms. In Bolivia the question of re-election is not likely to become such an 
issue, partly because of the coalition nature of all governments over the last 
La Paz 20.3 12.9 11.1 9.7 37.5 
Santa Cruz 24.9 24.2 16.0 25.9 2.2 
Beni 32.7 32.5 8.6 18.5 1.4 
Pando 38.3 26.9 15.9 9.9 3.2 
Oruro 21.9 15.6 17.5 15.0 20.5 
Potosi 19.6 16.7 21.8 14.9 10.9 
Cochabamba 23.7 11.7 19.9 16.2 4.3 
Chuquisaca 20.8 18.2 19.7 14.0 9.4 
Tarija 10.7 26.5 41.9 9.6 3.0 
National 
22.3 18.2 
16.8 16.1 17.2 
ADN MNR MIR UCS CON. 
MBL LU VS Eje PDB 
twelve years, but also simply because no government in that period ever 
succeeded in getting itself re-elected. It is, however, possible that Gonzalo 
Sanchez de Lozada, who left the presidency in 1997 - having previously lost the 
polls of 1989 and 1993 - could return as a strong candidate for the MNR in 
2002. Since Sanchez de Lozada - popularly known as 'Goni' - was a leading 
architect of the 1985 economic stabilisation plan which has so strategically 
underpinned the political transition, his presence has become one of the most 
notable features of public life. However, it should be stressed that he neither 
seeks a 'populist' niche of the type created by Fujimori and Menem nor, indeed, 
does he possess great interest in the type of 'charismatic' politics so often 
counterpoised to the administration of neoliberal policies. 
Secondly, reforms to the Constitution required that at least 30 per cent of all 
candidates in the 1997 poll be women. This unusual experiment in affirmative 
action proved relatively uncontroversial, perhaps because it did not result in any 
significant shift in the gender balance of representatives. Eventually, women 
accounted for 31 per cent of all candidates, 13 being elected to the 157-strong 
legislature (10 as plurinominal candidates; two as uninominales; and one 
senator). If the stand-bys (suplentes) for successful candidates are counted, a 
total of 34 were elected (all these coming from the party lists but not gaining 
enough votes to gain a seat under the quota assigned to their party). In 1989, 14 
out of 157 legislators (or seven per cent) were women; in 1993 the number was 
12 (with four suplentes). At present 135 out of 1,625 municipal councillors are 
women although in some cities, such as Sucre, women are a clear majority of 
voters.4 Local elections were held in 1987 for the first time since 1949 and then 
at two-yearly intervals, every other contest falling in the year of the national 
election but being held six months later, as in 1993 and 1997, which will serve 
as the first real test of the new system of local government discussed below. 
Finally, in this regard, it is worth making a brief comparative comment. I 
have chosen to do this with reference to the systems pertaining to the British 
Isles, but not simply because both the Irish republic and the UK held general 
elections within weeks of that in Bolivia. There is a broader sense in which the 
study of Latin American politics is stymied by comparisons being limited to the 
region or to those extra-continental states deemed to be undergoing a similar 
political experience (for example, in terms of transition from authoritarianism, 
Spain and Portugal in the 1970s and Eastern Europe in the 1990s). Yet the 
debate over the British electoral system has sharpened markedly over the last 
decade, to the extent that the Scottish Assembly approved by referendum in 
1997 will be elected according to the additional member system, combining 
party lists and Westminster constituency MPs. Furthermore, had the Labour 
Party not won such a resounding victory on 1 May its leadership might have 
been obliged to succumb to the significant lobby for the introduction of 
proportional representation in the UK as a whole.5 Table 9 shows what the effect 
4 La Razon, 29 May 1997. 
5 The principal lobby in this regard was Charter 88. For a detailed appraisal, see Patrick 
Dunleavy, Helen Margetts, Brendan O'Duffy and Stuart Weir (1997) Making Votes 
Count (University of Essex: Democratic Audit, paper no. 11). Bolivia still lacks a 
of the main electoral systems would have been on the composition of the House 
of Commons. 
Table 9 
UK General Election of May 1997: Actual and Simulated Results 
Conservative 165 88 189 207 
Labour 419 452 346 303 
Liberal Democrat 46 90 87 111 
Others 29 29 37 38 
(Alternative: 2nd pref. votes by constituency; STV: single transferable vote in 
large, multi-member constituencies; Add. Member: 50 per cent MPs chosen from 
party-list and 50 per cent from single-member constituencies) 
Source: Economist, 20 September 19976 
Equally, whilst the Irish adoption of the single transferable vote (STV) for 
popular elections to the most powerful chamber of the legislature (the Dail) is 
far from unique in Europe, it possesses a greater comparability with Bolivia than 
most. Ireland only experienced her revolution three decades earlier, the absence 
of subsequent military intervention allowing a prolonged competition between 
large and generally conservative movements, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, to 
which the contemporary leaderships of the ADN and MNR might aspire. In the 
same way, both the MIR and the MBL might see in the Irish Labour Party an 
example of an influential junior coalition role although in 1997 Dick Spring's 
party was punished for its pragmatic alliance with Fine Gael only slightly less 
severely than was Antonio Aranibar's MBL for backing the MNR in 1993-97. 
What is clear from the recent Irish experience is that the small parties have 
failed to make an impact on the position of the traditional movements to the 
same degree as have the new populist formations in Bolivia. However, this 
might well not last if the remarkable health of the Irish economy in the 1990s 
starts to fail - a fact so obvious that it should remind us that electoral systems 
may indeed matter but, ultimately, they merely translate decisions determined in 
a world made up of different measurements and estimations. 
comprehensive psephological study. The polls of 1979, 1980, 1985 and 1989 are 
surveyed from the perspective of party results in Salvador Romero Ballivian (1993) 
Geografia Electoral de Bolivia (La Paz: CEBEM/ILDIS). A broad summary of all results 
may be found in Carlos Mesa Gisbert (1990) Presidentes de Bolivia. Entre Urnas y 
Fusiles (La Paz: Gisbert, 2nd ed.). 
6 Slightly different figures are given in Dunleavy et al., Making Votes Count. 
Partv l.st past post Alternative STV Add. .Member 
Table 10 
Eire: General Election Results 1951-97 (% first preference votes; Dail) 
Progressive 
Democrats 
% seats % seats % seats % i seats % seats 
1951 46.3 69 25.8 40 11.4 16 
1954 43.4 65 32.0 50 12.1 19 0.2 2 1 
1957 48.3 78 26.6 40 9.1 12 5.4 4 
1961 43.8 70 32.0 47 11.7 16 3.0 0 
1965 47.7 72 34.1 47 15.4 22 
1969 44.6 75 33.3 50 16.6 18 
1973 46.2 69 35.1 54 13.7 19 
1977 50.6 84 30.6 43 11.6 17 
1981 45.3 78 36.5 65 9.9 15 
1982 (Feb.) 47.3 81 37.3 63 9.1 
1982 (Nov.) 45.2 75 39.2 70 9.4 16 
1987 44.2 81 27.1 51 6.5 12 1.9 ! 0 11.9 14 
1989 44.2 77 29.3 55 9.5 15 1.2 I 0 5.5 6 
1992 39.1 68 24.5 1 45 19.3 33 1.6 ! 0 4.7 10 
1997 39.3 77 | 27.9 | 54 10.4 17 2.5 | 1 4.7 4 
Others: Greens: 1987 0.4% (0) 
1989 1.5% (1) 
1992 1.4% (1) 
1997 2.8% (2) 
Democratic Left 1992 2.8% (6) 
1997 2.5% (4) 
Richard Sinnott, Irish Voters Decide, Manchester University Press, 1995. 
Parties and Blocs, 1985-96 
As can be discerned from Tables 3 and 4, the MNR was the dominant party in 
the political landscape of 'pre-transition' Bolivia: between 1952 and 1985 only 
one (very short) civilian government was headed by a president who was not a 
serving or past member of the party. If, as has sometimes been argued, the 
Bolivian party system is 'inchoate' this must have more to do with the 
fragmentation than the institutional longevity of its core political movement.7 
7 This argument is made by S. Mainwaring and T. Scully (eds.)(1995) Building 
Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press), the editors drawing largely on that volume's chapter on Bolivia by Eduardo A. 
Gamarra and James M. Malloy, who themselves describe the system as patrimonialist. 
Nevertheless, the return to prominence of the MNR after 1985 cannot be 
explained simply by its long-standing bedrock of support so much as by its 
capacity to exploit this in response to the economic and social crises presided 
over by the UDP coalition between 1982 and 1985. The key element in this 
regard was the movimientista jilting of expansionist and corporatist policies 
associated with the 1952 revolution and its imposition of a severe deflationary 
programme through Decreto Supremo 21060, introduced by President Victor 
Paz Estenssoro on 29 August 1985, less than a month after coming to power. 
That measure succeeded in driving down the hyperinflation that had prevailed 
under the military dictatorships and the UDP and, despite sporadic popular 
opposition and mobilisation, the decree continued to operate as a constant in 
macroeconomic policy under all governments thereafter. This continuity has 
been partly due to the fact that the programme was initially designed and later 
implemented by non-members of the MNR, such as Juan Cariaga and Juan 
Antonio Morales. It also resulted from the decision of the ADN - which had 
publicly campaigned for this policy in the 1985 elections whereas the MNR had 
been distinctly pusillanimous about it - to accept with good grace the purloining 
of its programme as well as to support the Paz administration under a formal 
agreement known as the 'Pacto por la Democracia'. This might be deemed the 
single most important instance of elite consensus in the Bolivian transition; it 
certainly enabled the government to withstand the extended popular reaction 
against the stabilisation plan and the collapse of the tin price at the end of the 
year. It is doubtful if the administration could have survived either pressure had 
the unions grouped in the COB not already over-reached themselves in contest 
with the UDP, but the experience of conservative collaboration from late 1985 
onwards was itself very important. 
Under Victor Paz the MNR effectively reversed the economic policies of 
1952-56 with which the president had once been so intimately associated. It is 
highly unlikely that Hugo Banzer could have achieved this, if Congress had 
recognised his heading of the 1985 poll and elected him to the presidency on the 
grounds of his modest yet perceptible victory in the popular vote (Table 5). 
Banzer was not seen as a 'monetarist' in the Pinochet mould, but he was still 
identified with military rule, and he possessed few links with other parties with 
which to build an alliance; in August 1985 only the ADN congressmen voted for 
him (Table 6). As an elder statesman and the erstwhile compahero of Hernan 
Siles Zuazo, the outgoing UDP president, Victor Paz combined association with 
a radical past, unparalleled experience, and 'imperial' style that enabled him to 
pick up the votes of the many small parties which won seats in this first truly 
post-dictatorial poll. Such a 'super-presidentialism' befitted a man in his eighth 
decade, and it has been depicted as the magisterial manner of closing a career of 
50 years. It was, though, more consequential than that. In the first place, Paz was 
the only figure in the political landscape to whom Banzer could at that moment 
defer with grace whilst retaining his political capital; Paz's presence allowed 
Banzer to lose the presidential run-off in style and yet hold the legal right 
together. Secondly, although the vagaries of the electoral system had given the 
MNR a lead over the ADN in terms of seats, the movimientistas did not seek -
and could barely hope - to repeat the run-off vote throughout a four-year term. 
Instead, they sided with the ADN to form an unassailable majority in Congress 
over the very parties who had just voted for Paz; this alliance guaranteed the 
passage of virtually all legislation through Congress (Table 6). Thirdly, as a 
result of these factors, Paz was able to hand day-to-day management of 
economic policy to his finance minister Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, who 
scarcely needed to worry himself with the problems of parliamentary alliances or 
sustaining popularity as he piloted through Bolivia's remarkable stabilisation 
and sought, with much less success, to fire up its desultory growth. 
The combination of a strong ideological and parliamentary conservative 
alliance, the presidency in the hands of a 'father of the nation' figure, and a 
highly able and confident manager of the economy was certainly felicitous for 
the implementation of public policy. Indeed, it may have saved Bolivia from 
becoming authentically 'inchoate' as the majority of its population suffered 
wretchedly under the impact of deflation, the collapse of the tin industry, the far 
from perfect rules of competition in narcotrafico, and the initially weak poverty 
alleviation programmes. Yet the strengths of this truly transitional administration 
spawned a backlash as well as encouraging hubris within the MNR, which 
predictably put Sanchez de Lozada up as its presidential candidate, and 
unpredictably broke off the Pacto por la Democracia prior to the poll of 1989. 
We still lack a detailed and authoritative explanation for this move, but all the 
indications are that, having benefited so handsomely from coalition politics, the 
MNR seriously misconstrued the reasons for this, mistakenly assumed that it 
would be rewarded by the voters for reducing inflation and could therefore 
jettison the ADN and move behind the electoral pendulum to the centre. Under 
the circumstances, it is remarkable that the party was not more severely punished 
at the 1989 poll, and although it lost both the presidency and a congressional 
majority, it was able to constitute a vocal opposition and retain many 
appointments in the state sector, particularly the senior ranks of the judiciary. 
However, in 1989 the defeat of the MNR was less notable than the manner in 
which the new administration was formed - an experience which gave rise to the 
popular story that, on visiting the shrine of the Virgin of Urkupina, Sanchez de 
Lozada asked that he might be granted his wish to win the election, Jaime Paz 
Zamora that he be made president, and General Banzer that he be allowed to run 
the country, and that all three had their wishes fully realised.8 As can be seen 
from Table 5, the MNR headed the poll, just ahead of the ADN, with a 
considerable improvement in the vote of Paz Zamora's Movimiento de la 
Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), a centrist movement which had quit the UDP 
government as soon as it entered crisis, despite the fact that Paz Zamora was 
vice-president of the Republic. No longer at the head of the poll, now plainly 
unable to ally with the MNR, and with the smaller parties located firmly on the 
left of the spectrum, Banzer played kingmaker by backing Paz Zamora, the 
8 This anecdote is recounted in a most useful analysis of recent Bolivian political 
developments: Eduardo A. Gamarra (1997) 'Hybrid Presidentialism and 
Democratization: The Case of Bolivia', in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg 
Shugart (eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
third-placed candidate, to be president. Despite the closeness of the MIR's result 
to those of the front-running parties, this decision aroused acute controversy 
over the legitimacy of the congressional vote for the presidency, and the 
Constitution was later amended to restrict the run-off to the two candidates 
leading the popular poll. 
Banzer, whilst punishing his erstwhile allies for their fair-weather friendship, 
refused to enter into another formal agreement. Nonetheless, the loose Acuerdo 
Patriotico (AP) between the ADN and the MIR lasted up until and through the 
poll of 1993, and its strong parliamentary majority fortified the image of a 
benevolent ex-dictator generously backing a party formed 18 years before 
precisely in order to overthrow his regime. Again, coalition politics had 
contrived to throw up a strangely complementary pairing - this time in terms of 
generation and partisan reconciliation. The AP would not seriously tamper with 
the macro-economic strategy established in 1985 whilst it strove to project a 
more balanced approach to stabilisation and a more relaxed, modern and 
'inclusive' style of government. 
The fact that this failed to consolidate over the following four years owes a 
good deal to the role of the MIR, which was the junior party of the alliance 
despite holding the presidency. With its roots in radical Christian Democracy 
and the insecurely radical urban middle classes of the late 1960s, the MIR had 
never been tempted for long to dwell within the hard, 'Leninist' left of Bolivia 
that had such a rigorous programmatic pedigree, proletarian constituency and 
unsated appetite for sectarianism. Its role as a 'bridge-party' of the centre, able 
to operate flexibly with the populist derivations of the old MNR and the 
orthodox left rooted in the unions had made the MIR a vital element in the UDP 
and, arguably, delivered victory to that coalition in 1980. Now, though, the MIR 
sought to hold both the centre ground and power by blocking with the right. The 
tensions caused by this shift had already split the party in 1986 between a 
pragmatic officialist wing and a 'principled' group under the leadership of 
Antonio Aranibar that went on to form the Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL). 
Three years later, with its vote doubled and supported by the ADN, the MIR 
seemed to have extracted maximum advantage from its relocation in the political 
spectrum. However, it is telling that the MBL (which fought the 1989 poll as 
part of the left-wing pact Izquierda Unida) began to describe itself as 'trigo 
limpio' - a phrase which artfully differentiated it from the rising reputation for 
placemanship and corruption acquired by the Paz Zamora faction, now 
distributing the offices and favours of the state with an energy exclusive to those 
who have never previously availed themselves of the rewards of the 
patrimonialist circuit. 
This sense of corrosion in a still incipient, fragile system was hardened by a 
serious dispute between the legislature (controlled by the AP) and the Supreme 
Court (dominated by the MNR) that came to involve impeachment of the 
justices of the court and a dangerous stalemate over interpretation of the 
Constitution, blocking much government business. The fact that the result of the 
elections and political manoeuvres could so readily destabilise ostensibly non-
partisan institutions of the state was both generally disruptive and a specific 
warning to the MNR that, just as it could not expect to win elections outright or 
make and break alliances at will, nor could it simply transfer the tasks of 
opposition to those sections of the state apparatus that it happened to control 
with an indifferent or neutral effect on the Constitutional order as a whole. The 
eventual solution of this crisis in May 1991 included the exchange of a new 
electoral law for retention of the justices in their posts. But, as might be 
expected, this did not presage the comprehensive reform of the judicial system 
advocated by modernisers from all parties (including the MNR's Rene 
Blattmann, who managed to introduce some important changes in custodial 
policy and sentencing procedure in the 1993-97 government).9 
Both official placemanship and the crisis over the Supreme Court revealed 
the extent of drug interests in the political parties and the state, the question of 
narcotrafico returning to the top of both domestic and diplomatic agendas after 
a relatively low profile in the mid-1980s (despite the fact that receipts from 
cocaine had readily entered the banking system and palpably palliated the 
impact of structural adjustment). In this respect it is important to recall that 
Jaime Paz Zamora and the AP administration took office in August 1989, on the 
very cusp of the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, and that this government would 
witness the collapse of Communism in the company of the Bush administration 
in the United States, which sought to implement a comprehensive anti-drug 
campaign in the western hemisphere. The prior preparedness of the Paz 
Estenssoro government formally to collaborate with high-profile interdiction 
operations - such as 4Blast Furnace* in 1986 - that involved deployment of US 
forces on Bolivian soil had given the MIR what seemed to be a low-cost 
nationalist platform, from which it continued to proclaim in office that 'coca is 
not cocaine'. This was a popular enough motif at home, and it played well with 
those sections of the international community convinced that Washington was 
seeking to shift to the south the economic, social and political costs of its anti-
drug campaign by emphasising the problems of supply over those of demand. 
However, Paz Zamora misjudged a balance of forces that was, indeed, 
exceptionally mercurial. In addition to the wider international instability, 
including the de-escalation of the Central American civil wars that had so 
preoccupied Washington, his cabinet had to make sense of the unprecedentedly 
violent intromission of the cartels into Colombian politics; the extensive 
operations of Sendero Luminoso in neighbouring Peru; and the emergence there 
of Alberto Fujimori as a regional political figure of maverick qualities but 
critical importance for La Paz. Even with the invasion of Panama at the end of 
the year, it is not difficult to imagine how in such a scenario a policy of avowed 
autonomy towards the USA might commend itself, especially if conducted in 
harness with collaboration in practice. 
9 For a full account of this crisis and the wider political and institutional landscape, see 
Maria del Pilar Domingo Villegas (1993) 'Democracy in the Making? Political Parties 
and Political Institutions in Bolivia, 1985-1991' (D. Phil, thesis, University of Oxford). 
THE 1997 BOLIVIAN ELECTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Table 11 
Drugs and US Aid 
Anti-Drug Operations, Bolivia 1991-97 
processing plants 1386 1052 938 1613 2131 1660 
distillation vats 2531 1913 1727 2753 3077 2819 
persons 1047 1226 1376 2634 2494 2585 
cocaine base (tons) 9.48 10.19 9.51 8.82 9.5 10.0 
Source: FELCN 
Coca Cultivation and Eradication 
1986 25,800 
1987 30,646 
1988 38,400 
1989 41,816 
1990 44,462 
1991 39,086 
1992 36,746 
1993 35,500 2,400 
1994 35,000 2,240 
1995 30,000 5,492 
1996 25,000 7,575 
1997/8 target set by USA - 7 ,000 hectares by May 1998 
- agreed by cocaleros, 2 September 1997. 
Source: Presencia, 20 July 1997. 
US Aid to Bolivia ($m) 
; Economic support 59.5 31.0 16.7 15.0 
Development 26.9 19.8 30.0 
28.2 
Food aid 43.2 36.0 19.9 21.3 
Total 129.6 86.8 66.6 
Source: USAID 
Year Cultivated Eradicated 
(estimated hectares) (hectares) 
detained/destroyed 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
1993 1994 1995 1996 
Although drug scandals over the last decade have involved members of all 
the main parties together with the police, armed forces and judiciary, 
Washington's attention focused on the MIR, particularly once combined 
pressure from the embassy and press forced Interior Minister Guillermo 
Capobianco from office in March 1991. After the MIR left government in 1993, 
the party's number two, Oscar Eid, was jailed for four years for protecting 
traffickers, and Washington refused to issue visas to either Jaime Paz Zamora 
himself or to Carlos Saavedra, a senior minister in the outgoing government and 
effectively Eid's replacement in the party hierarchy.10 This probably did the 
MIR little harm in the 1997 poll since it enabled the party to make a positive 
virtue out of its necessary distance from the USA, but it has further complicated 
an already critical aspect of public policy for several years. As can be seen from 
Table 11, interdiction operations and reduction of the cocales were maintained 
under the Paz Zamora government with roughly the same results as those 
registered by its predecessor and successor. These have been distinctly modest 
in the sense that between 1986 and 1996 the overall area under coca has been 
reduced little, if at all. But given that Bolivia is, in Washington's estimation, the 
world's second largest producer of coca and cocaine - and that cultivation of the 
former nearly doubled over the period - the expenditure of some $200 million in 
eradication and interdiction might be said to have yielded some success. 
A significant degree of compliance with Washington was always necessary 
for the simple reason that the USA accounts for over 30 per cent of Bolivia's 
foreign trade. However, the prominence under the Clinton administration of the 
policy of 'decertification', whereby disbursement of US aid is conditional upon 
local acceptance and realisation of eradication targets, has sharpened the 
relationship, not least because World Bank loans - and much private investment 
- would also be put in jeopardy. As Table 11 shows, under the Sanchez de 
Lozada government Bolivia received a diminishing amount of aid from the 
USA, largely as a result of economic recovery. However, the most vulnerable 
funds - those for development - have not reduced and could have been frozen or 
withdrawn had the administration in La Paz not been so warmly disposed 
towards Washington and generally able to deliver compliance on the part of the 
most reluctant cocaleros, who have replaced the miners as the most vocal and 
independent sector of the populace. It is telling that, once it had issued a 10-
point 'ethical charter', the first public challenge faced by the Banzer government 
in 1997 was to extract from Evo Morales and the coca-growers of the Chapare 
an agreement to meet the US-ordained targets.11 Indeed, the initial weeks of the 
10 The best analysis of the political consequences of the cocaine trade is Hugo Rodas 
Morales (1997) Huanchaca: Model Politico-Empresarial de la Cocaina en Bolivia (La 
Paz: Plural). 
11 On 16 August 1997 the new administration issued an injunction to its members, 
supporters and civil servants including the following: 1. Strict adhesion to the law; 2. 
Respect for the citizen; 3. Correct use of state property (no private use of public vehicles 
or cellular phones; no use of sirens except by the vehicles of the president and vice-
president); 4. Austerity; 5. Discipline; 6. Sobriety; 7. Sense of self-criticism; 8. Sense of 
modesty; 9. Democratic collegiality with opponents; 10. Honesty. (La Razon, 17 Aug. 
1997). 
Banzer government reflected in raw form the exigencies of fiscal policy imposed 
by external conditionality - Vice-President Quiroga had almost immediately to 
attend the Hong Kong conference of the IMF and World Bank. This increasingly 
familiar 'globalised' scenario, however, included much less violence than in 
Colombia or even Peru or Mexico. The Bolivian experience of narcotrafico has 
at no stage involved guerrilla groups, and it has rarely thrown up producers or 
traders whose operations consistently depend upon violent activity. Interdiction 
on the scale indicated in Table 11 has inevitably involved loss of life, and the 
specialist anti-drug forces have regularly been accused of human rights 
violations (under the 1993-97 government 22 people died, 105 were wounded 
and 2,002 were detained in public order operations).12 Yet, the dichotomy 
between corruption and violence is as false as it is simplistic, and the ideological 
and institutional trajectory of national politics from 1985 onwards cannot be 
seen in isolation from - or as simply parallel to - the character of the local drug 
economy, especially its connections with the semi-legal cultivation of the coca 
leaf that directly underpins the subsistence of tens of thousands of poor people. 
The national election of 1993 reflected this state of affairs in confirming the 
serious nature of the challenge to the traditional parties from two new 
movements of strong 'populist' vocation and style: Conciencia de Patria 
(CONDEPA) led by ex-folk musician and La Paz television proprietor Carlos 
Palenque, who had polled well in 1989, and the Union Civica de Solidaridad 
(UCS), set up by the Cochabambino beer magnate Max Fernandez, who was 
equally of humble origin. Although CONDEPA began its existence as an 
urbanised Aymara movement focused on the poorest sectors of El Alto and La 
Paz, whilst the UCS was less regionally restricted and appeared to gain more 
success in the provinces, both parties had clearly emerged and developed in 
response to the deflationary climate and restructuring begun by DS 21060. 
Headed by charismatic figures, driven by loose rhetoric and sharp expression of 
complaint, invoking threats to community and cultural values, dependent upon 
the reputation of being as well as representing 'outsiders', these movements 
sought national as well as local office but rarely propounded precise policies that 
might form the basis of a platform for government. Indeed, although much 
interesting analysis has been devoted to their ambiguous origins, declamatory 
discourse and contradictory impact on cultural identity, it is possible to view 
both organisations as vehicles for a machine politics run by a new 
entrepreneurial sector of mestizo background.13 
12 Presencia, 16 Feb. 1997. 
13 Fernando Mayorga (1991) Max Fernandez. La Politica del Silencio (La Paz: 
UMMS/ILDIS); Fernando Mayorga (1993) Discurso y Politica en Bolivia (La Paz: 
CERES/ILDIS); Carlos F. Toranzo Roca and Mario Arrieta Abdalla (1989) Nueva 
Derecha y Desproletizacion en Bolivia (La Paz: UNITAS/ILDIS); Hugo San Martin 
(1991) El Palenquismo (La Paz: Amigos del Libro); Joaquin Saravia and Godofredo 
Sandoval (1991) Jach'a Uru: ^La Esperanza de un Pueblo? Carlos Palenque, RTPy los 
Sectores Populares Urbanos de La Paz (La Paz: CEP/ILDIS); Rafael Archondo (1991) 
Compadres al Microfono: La Resurreccion Metropolitana del Ayllu (La Paz: HISBOL); 
Roberto Lasema (1992) Productores de Democracia (Cochabamba: CERES); J. Antonio 
Mayorga (1996) Gonismo. Discurso y Poder (Cochabamba: UMSS/FACES); Carlos 
Blanco Cazas and Godofredo Sandoval (1993) La Alcaldia de La Paz. Entre Populistas, 
Modernistas y Culturalistas, 1985-1993 (La Paz: ILDIS). 
In 1993 each of the populist parties won nearly a quarter of a million votes 
(14 per cent of the turnout), in part at the expense of the AP coalition - which 
could only muster half of the votes that the ADN and MIR had won by running 
separately in 1989 (Table 5) - but also partly by swallowing up the support of 
the small, radical, regional and personalist parties. These had secured 26 seats in 
the 1985 Congress and were now all but eliminated from the scene by a 'catch-
all' oppositional offensive which eschewed traditional ideology and yet did not 
sacrifice rhetorical energy to the pursuit of state position, thereby expanding an 
already formidable capacity to deliver clientelist favours. The 'professional' 
politicos had little difficulty in disparaging Palenque's reliance upon the 'culture 
of complaint' stoked up by his TV programme 'Tribuna Libre del Pueblo', and 
they could plausibly doubt the solidity of support for Fernandez based upon 
liberal distribution of free beer. Yet the 1993 poll clearly established popular 
proclivity for these options - whatever the degree of protest this entailed -and 
that of 1997 would confirm their presence on the scene, notwithstanding the 
recent death of both leaders and the involvement of both parties in government 
(CONDEPA in the municipal administration of El Alto and La Paz; UCS in the 
national coalition led by the MNR). 
If the 1993 election result required the conservatives to negotiate with the 
new populist organisations, it also indicated a recurrent tendency on the part of 
the electorate to punish the incumbent administration, this time more severely 
than it had the MNR in 1989 (repeating this result in the local elections of 
December 1993 - see Table 12). On that basis Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada 
readily won both the highest popular vote and the congressional run-off, in 
which Banzer did not even figure. However, the movimientistas had learned the 
lessons of 1989, and they went to some lengths to construct a coalition which 
would include not only the centre-left MBL (not itself engaged in a pragmatic 
pirouette of a type it once scorned so severely) but also the UCS, which lacked 
any track-record or ideological basis for rejecting the lure of office, and, as vice-
president, Victor Hugo Cardenas Conde, who headed the Movimiento 
Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberation (MRTKL). This last appointment 
was seemingly a very generous sop to the rather stiff but talented and honourable 
Aymara intellectual who held a very modest constituency in the northern 
altiplano. However, it transpired to be one of Sanchez de Lozada's more 
inspired gambles in that Cardenas, with an awkward combination of idealism 
and realpolitik, single-mindedly promoted the idea of a multi-ethnic state 
through the representation of indigenous identity, this form of 'cultural polities' 
proving remarkably popular at home and abroad. The impact on hard policy was 
slight in the extreme - as Cardenas's initial supporters were quick to point out -
but the longer-term influence could be much more consequential, forming a 
piece with Bolivia's avoidance of the type of social disintegration and violence 
witnessed in Peru. 
The Sanchez de Lozada Administration 
The MNR needed to form a coalition in 1993 in order to control both houses of 
Congress. In the event, it assembled an alliance which mustered 97 of the 157 
seats at stake - more than the number needed for amending the Constitution, 
which would be required if Sanchez de Lozada was to realise his ambitious 
programme of reforms, the 'Plan de Todos'. This had initially seemed little more 
than flamboyant campaign rhetoric, but 'Goni's ' reputation as an innovative 
tecnico easily outstripped that of Banzer or Jaime Paz, whose coalition had 
become mired in 'sleaze' and inertial tinkering with the earlier MNR 
programme. Moreover, one should not underestimate the degree to which the 
decision by Cardenas and Aranibar (separately) to cross the traditional 
ideological divide both encouraged a popular view of the new administration as 
a post-Cold War government and gave Sanchez de Lozada himself the resolve to 
pursue his own programme with non-partisan energy. In the event, neither of 
these minor coalition allies salvaged much from the experience of 1993-97 if 
this is measured narrowly in zero-sum, partisan terms: the MRTKL was unable 
even to stand in 1997, and the MBL was severely chastised by the voters. By 
contrast, the UCS, which was the least creative and disciplined member of the 
government, escaped the backlash entirely, perhaps because it was so 'semi-
detached' that it never became associated with a programme that went well 
beyond DS 21060 in dismantling the institutional and macroeconomic legacy of 
the 1952 revolution. 
The two axes of the 'Plan de Todos' lay in administrative decentralisation 
and privatisation, but both were designed with greater attention to mass 
'participation' than most policies of this type, now familiar in the subcontinent 
because of their popularity with the large multilateral organisations, particularly 
the World Bank. Although neither policy had been fully implemented by 1997, 
the electorate had clearly registered their initial impact. In the case of the Ley de 
Participation Popular of April 1994 there had been a significant distribution of 
fiscal revenue from the central state to the 311 Organizaciones Territoriales de 
Base (OTBs) established across the country to administer health, education and 
other local services. In 1990 Bolivia's total municipal budget had been $22 
million; by 1996 it was over $150 million - more than 30 per cent of total public 
expenditure. Between 1994 and 1995 municipal expenditure per capita rose 
from $11.2 to $41.1, but it should be noted that a full 46 per cent of the 
population was concentrated in just seven municipalities.14 The establishment of 
comites de vigilancia was supposed to give local support for the statutory 
restriction of spending on wages to 10 per cent of each OTB's budget as well as 
to provide more general oversight. To the inevitable incidence of poor 
organisation in the transfer of services and 'windfall' exploitation of confusion 
and change by local caudillos and crooks, one should add the no less predictable 
conflicts over resources both within and between OTBs. It is as yet difficult to 
gain a firm sense of the impact on local structures and dynamics of power. 
14 Santa Cruz (13%); La Paz (12%); Cochabamba (7%); El Alto (7%); Oruro (3%); Sucre 
(2.5%); Tarija (2%). 
Government propaganda was often highly exaggerated. Many communities did 
certainly receive income for the first time, and others now managed enhanced 
resources, but, by the same token, their new duties implied a far greater 
expenditure. The electoral out-turn of this root and branch alteration of the 
country's local government was not sensibly predictable beyond the early 
success registered by the parties of the governing coalition in the December 
1995 local poll as a result of a huge publicity campaign (Table 12). 
Table 12 
Municipal Elections, 1993 and 1995 
% Concejales % Concejales 
ADN-PDC 7.8 262 11.4 233 
ASD 1.8 10 — -
CONDEPA 19.6 323 15.5 131 
EJE 0.6 15 1.8 25 
FRI 2.2 17 3.1 27 
FSB 2.1 10 — _ 
IU 0.8 8 3.0 58 
MBL 11.7 213 13.3 216 
MIR 9.4 245 9.3 138 
MKN _ _ 0.2 4 
MNR 34.9 1,330 21.3 478 
MPP _ _ 1.9 8 
MRTKL 0.2 2 1.2 33 
UCS 8.4 372 17.5 231 
VR-9 0.2 3 0.5 2 
Total votes 1,119,854 1,716,007 
Null/void 70,042 89,625 
Registered 2,231,945 2,840,492 
Abstentions (%) 47 36 
Sanchez de Lozada dubbed his government's privatisation policy one of 
'capitalisation' (Law 1544 of March 1994), insisting that the sale of 50 per cent 
of the stock of public companies, together with transfer of full managerial 
powers to the private sector, was essential in order to overhaul inefficient 
entities. This sale was depicted as being a necessary complement to the 
stabilisation policy of a decade earlier in renovating the legacy of 1952. By the 
time of the poll nine companies had been sold for a total of $1.7 billion (not all 
of which was in liquid form). These included the national airline, Lloyd Aereo 
Boliviano (to the Brazilian VASP); ENTEL, the weak but potentially very 
profitable telecommunications company (to the Italian STET, which was soon 
Party 1993 1995 
subject to regulatory fines); and two sales that aroused controversy on the 
grounds of national security - the national railway company to the Chilean Cruz 
Blanca corporation (which immediately closed down the Sucre-Potosi branch-
line) and YPFB's oil and gas distribution branch (at $263 million, worth around 
30 per cent of the company's total value) to ENRON-Shell. The prior 
performance of many of these companies was sufficiently poor to limit popular 
protest within a society generally sympathetic to the idea of public ownership. 
Moreover, the rise of new foreign investment from $35 million in 1990 to $520 
million in 1996 lessened the impact of charges that Sanchez de Losada, himself 
a wealthy entrepreneur, was stripping the state of assets on behalf of the business 
community.15 
If this policy was both more predictable and controversial than 'popular 
participation', there can be little doubt about the novelty (and strong electoral 
potential) of the government's proposals for the use of the receipts of 
privatisation - distribution to the public in the form of pensions. This required a 
considerable logistical undertaking since the central Bolivian state had 
previously run only one very modest pension system - for the veterans of the 
Chaco War against Paraguay (1932-5), now covering only 8,603 benemeritos 
and 13,571 widows (subject to unusual assessment in case of matrimony on 
fraudulent grounds by 'cazabenemeritos ').16 In the event, the reorganisation of 
pension funds (AFPs) proved to be more restrictive for savers than even the 
much-vaunted Chilean system since membership of one of the two private 
systems in La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba and the one reserved for the rest 
of the country was obligatorily assigned (although mandatory levels of 
contribution could be enhanced in all). The closure of some substantial 
professional schemes was not accompanied with full guarantees for their 
transferred assets, and it was fiercely resisted by, for instance, the national 
medical association, which witnessed serious problems in public sector clinical 
provision as a result of the attendant amalgamation of professionally-associated 
hospitals and clinics. The military, by contrast, quickly accepted the proposals 
but appear not to have grasped the full consequences of closure and 
amalgamation - something that may be subject to review in the wake of 
Banzer's election. 
By far the greatest attention was focused on the payment of a pension (Bono 
de Solidaridad - Bonosol: a sunny enough term to throw a shadow over any 
affinity with the Mexican public works system set up by Carlos Salinas) to those 
over 65 years of age. The plan was to pay the equivalent of $248 to some 
300,000 pensioners in 1997. This, it should be stressed, represented a 
considerable sum to many inhabitants of a country with such a low average 
15 A. Solfs Rada (1997) La Fortuna del Presidente (La Paz). 
16 By early 1997 the state had contrived to identify 1,176 4cazabenemeritos' of between 
17 and 50 years of age. At that stage the youngest veteran of the Chaco War would have 
been 77 (Hoy, 9 March 1997). Whilst a very poor state must certainly guard against 
inadmissible claims on its slight resources, one feels distinctly uneasy about this 
particularly rigorous audit, and it is to be hoped that both younger women and elderly 
gentlemen derived happiness and security from even the prospect of union. 
income (some $800 per head). Indeed, the promise soon flushed out many new 
'citizens'; there were 614,000 more registered voters in 1997 than in 1993, 
including two men of 93 and 107 years in the La Paz town of Ancoraimes who 
had never previously acquired any documentation from the state.17 With its 
capacity for simple registration under pressure - let alone its actuarial skills -
the state managed to pay pensions to only 150,000 people by the time of the 
poll, and substantial doubts remained as to the capacity of the AFPs to meet 
early expectations despite the fact that they had overnight become some of the 
most powerful and protected bodies within the national economy.18 On the other 
hand, efforts within the MNR to exploit the Bonosol for party ends were largely 
contained, and Banzer was able to identify himself closely enough with a system 
the details of which he criticised - for example, by promising to lower the rural 
retirement age to 55 - so as not to lose electoral advantage.19 
As with the other main planks of government policy, the brief record of the 
pension reform was not so poor in either conception or execution to suggest that 
the administration would be seriously penalised by the voters. There were 
understandable doubts concerning manipulation of unfamiliar systems and 
institutions - a response equally elicited by new agrarian reform legislation. In 
the past, such statutes have proved highly and justifiably controversial, 
especially in the altiplano and valleys, but the new law appeared to be wholly 
favourable to community and small-owner interests in its abolition of low-level 
taxation, the guarantees given to collective title, and the privileges advanced to 
the communities in terms of allocation of public lands. Nevertheless, the statute 
was treated in many sectors as being a contemporary expression of a free-market 
lineage stretching back to Bolivar's Trujillo decree, Melgarejo's piratical 
expropriations of 1866, and the decisive Ley de ex-vinculacion of 1884. 
Certainly, neither the MNR's authorship nor the support of Victor Hugo 
Cardenas led to a widespread conviction that the law was a simple development 
or improvement on the agrarian reform of August 1953. 
Perhaps in all these cases the imbrication of public and private spheres - the 
admixture of community and individual interest - was indeed recognised, being 
viewed as both potentially efficient and equitable, but it was not yet trusted to 
work. It has been observed that Sanchez de Losada could be seen more as a 
'legislator' than a 'governor',20 but even had he and his government expended 
more effort on the tasks of reassurance as opposed to celebration, it may be 
doubted whether they would have greatly soothed a popular disquiet which, as in 
1985-89, had less to do with rational calculation than a more profound 
insecurity. 
17 Ultima Hora, 20 April 1997. 
18 As the AFPs went into operation the need for regulation of the financial sector was 
starkly illustrated by the revelation that the country's Fondos de Vivienda (building 
associations or co-operatives) had not been obliged to maintain proper accounts before 
1993 despite holding an estimated $130 million. Presencia, 11 Sept. 1997. 
19 Ultima Hora, 18 May 1997; Presencia, 16 June 1997. 
20 Eduardo Gamarra, 'Goni's Unsung Swansong', Hemisphere, Miami, April 1997. 
Something of the same reaction may be found in the voters' response to 
general economic performance, which was formally solid enough to give 
grounds for the 'feel-good factor' that has so attracted Anglo-Saxon 
psephologists in recent years. As might be expected, given his experience as 
finance minister for Victor Paz Estenssoro, 'Goni' kept inflation under tight 
control, obtaining an average of 10 per cent over 1993-6 and a level of 8 per 
cent - the lowest in 20 years - over the 12 months prior to the poll. At 3.9 per 
cent the rate of economic growth was less impressive, especially with the 
population expanding at 2.4 per cent. However, as we have seen, investment was 
quite healthy in terms of Bolivia's distinctly modest record in the past, and 
recent export performance was relatively satisfactory - $1.2 billion in 1996 with 
decreased volume but increased value in minerals and reduced sales of some 
non-traditional products (coffee, vegetable oil, artisanal produce) matched by 
increases in others (soya, Brazil nuts, wood). Moreover, confirmation of 
substantial reserves of natural gas (up to 9 trillion cubic feet) available from 
1999 was capped by the signing of a 22-year contract to supply Brazil with gas 
worth up to $500 million a year through a 3,150 km pipeline under construction 
between Rio Grande and Puerto Suarez.21 
These, of course, were big and generally distant issues, often learned about 
from the mass media rather than sensed directly in daily life. On the street and in 
popular consciousness the image and experience of 'progress and modernity' 
was far more ambiguous. This can be seen in the manifestation of the market-as-
modern-retailing, with the establishment in La Paz of a string of new or 
expanded supermarkets - Ketal; Hypermaxi; Zatt; Bonanza. By mid-1997 these 
had captured some 15 per cent of urban grocery sales but not on the classic 
grounds of the economies of scale and loss-leaders, their prices failing to 
undercut those of the traditional street- and covered-markets across a range of 32 
basic necessities, and being markedly higher on prime cuts of meat. It is unlikely 
that higher standards of hygiene account for this market-share, which probably 
owes more to the pleasurable sensation of supermarket shopping, even if that 
currently constitutes an 'event' based on novelty or becomes part of a more 
differentiated strategy of buying by consumers. There are still millions of dollars 
tied up in highly profitable 'cholo' wholesale and retail enterprises in the streets 
and alley-ways in the north of the city and El Alto; Bolivia is very far from 
adopting 'mall culture' even if its most affluent suburbs may embrace the idea 
and institute their own mini-versions of it. However, the process is more 
advanced in Santa Cruz, and McDonald's decision to establish a restaurant in 
the capital cannot be seen as $2 million lightly expended in a society dedicated 
at all levels to traditional heavy lunches. In the same vein, the growth of the 
telecommunications sector by over 11 per cent in the last two years - compared 
with the general rate of 4 per cent - is, as elsewhere, to a large extent accounted 
for by cellular phones. Increased use of personal computers amongst the urban 
middle class, together with rapid rises in the rate of connection to the Internet in 
both private and public spheres, suggest that this is a strong complementary 
source of expansion and a possible conduit for the poorest nation in South 
21 Presencia, 20 and 26 July 1997. 
America to short-cut some of the arduous routes out of 'underdevelopment'. 
The need to escape that condition is underlined by its very extremity. In 
1996, as we have noted, the average per capita income in Bolivia was $800 per 
annum; life expectancy stood at 60 years, and the official infant mortality rate at 
75 deaths per 1,000 live births. The fact that 38 per cent of children under five 
are malnourished indicates the principal reason for such an appalling statistic. 
Basic sanitation, control of diarrhoea, promotion of breast feeding, and access to 
paediatric care are low-cost essentials for child survival - especially in the first 
12 months of life - but these remain largely dependent upon foreign aid and 
NGOs. The public health system is, in fact, more disorganised than it is 
subverted by malfeasance, but the level of corruption, clientelism and 
favouritism is seen as high throughout the state as a whole. In 1997 the company 
Transparency International ranked Bolivia as the 36th worst case of corruption 
in the world (Nigeria coming last in 54th position). The methodology employed 
in this exercise was criticised as being clumsy and 'subjective', but the ranking 
of Chile at half Bolivia's level does not strike one as a travesty, and objections 
to the league table from La Paz were not unreservedly fortified by the 
simultaneous announcement by the local police that they had broken a major 
car-ring operated out of the navy offices by one Captain Clever Alcoba.22 In 
fact, even within the legal sphere attention to the division of the spoils remains 
sharp enough to suggest only a very slight reduction in patrimonialist practices. 
Following Banzer's victory the press reported that his allocation of the senior 
offices of state had resulted in the ADN receiving 54.14 per cent of the 
ministries and CONDEPA 14.28 per cent. At one level this is no more than a 
contemporary expression of Bourbon punctiliousness, but it does also suggest an 
instinctive suspension of belief in public service.23 
One recent instance of the retrograde nature of partial 'modernity' can be 
seen in the case of five members of the small Uru-murato ethnic group who were 
arrested in August 1994 for hunting birds protected by law in their traditional 
grounds of Lake Poopo. Held in jail for a year without trial, they were eventually 
released on bail, but after three years had received no sentence from Judge Ana 
Rosa Quiroga; during this period one of those held, a 78-year old man, had died 
- 'of fright' according to his co-defendants, who were freshly charged with 
'ecological crimes' in September 1997.24 An equal sense of the pertinence of the 
past could be found in the limited success of the arms amnesty offered to the 
Laime people of the north of Potosi by the local prefect in the week before the 
election. Although the authorities celebrated the hand-over of several modern 
weapons by the community, this was the third such agreement in two years and 
seemed most unlikely to pacify a region which had experienced violent land 
disputes throughout the colonial and republican eras. There was certainly 
nothing in the new agrarian legislation that offered relief on that score. 
21 Presencia, 21 June; 11 Sept. 1997. 
23 La Razon,3\ Aug. 1997. 
24 Presencia, 2 and 3 Sept. 1997. 
On the other hand, the continuing cultural and economic power of the 
Entrada del Gran Poder in La Paz, and the rise to prominence in recent years of 
the Entrada Universitaria represent confident and energetic expressions of 
indigenous tradition, no less impressive for the inclusion of Afro-Bolivian 
rhythms or the participation of young white women pirouetting in baroque mini-
polleras. The idea of a 'pluri-multi-ethnic state' still languishes in the 
imagination of intellectuals bailed from detention in a Cold War mind-set, but 
civil society is increasingly proud of its non-hispanic culture, which is now 
sufficiently integrated into the mainstream to lose the tag of 'folklore' and 
foment an appreciable market. Even the notoriously Europhile and circumspect 
middle class of Santiago de Chile expressed admiration at the passage down 
their alameda of a large contingent of Bolivian dancers in 1995, and in the last 
few years La Paz tailors have become an essential element in the economy of the 
Rio carnival. This was the backdrop to CONDEPA's electoral success, as it was 
to the smooth integration of Victor Hugo Cardenas into the MNR government of 
1993-97. It is also surely an important contributory factor to the absence of a 
racially charged violence that could rock the dominant market and state 
(sometimes described as 'Americanised' because of their integration into the 
wider US circuit but better understood as being 'European', rather than 
indigenous, in origin). 
The 1997 Campaign 
The election campaign of 1997 enveloped and expressed these powerfully 
contradictory features as well as the more explicit display of party and personal 
conduct. The fact that the UCS leader Max Fernandez died in an air crash in 
1996 and CONDEPA's Carlos Palenque expired of a heart attack in the midst of 
the campaign could well account for the high vote of those parties in the June 
poll, just as it might explain any subsequent decline and extinction. It is unlikely, 
however, that the general 'style' of these parties will disappear from the national 
scene, regardless of the success experienced by the Fernandez and Palenque 
children in handling the inherited vitalicio leadership of their parents' 
organisations. 
The continued salience of the MIR in electoral calculations was underscored 
by its ability to bisect the vote of CONDEPA and the UCS. The MIR's 21-point 
programme opened with an appeal for 'confidence in ourselves', and it ended 
with the slogan, 'Solutions - Yes; Experiments - No', which is arguably in 
contradiction with the first point but unarguably rhetoric of the most vapid type. 
This characteristic feature of the MIR's politics was to some degree offset by 
thinly-veiled nationalist sniping at the USA, and the party did not have to 
concern itself greatly with radical challenges. The representative of the orthodox 
left, Juan de la Cruz of Izquierda Unida, campaigned on the grounds that Bolivia 
is a state without a nation; that it needs to be socialised, and that the only way to 
rid it of corruption is to throw out the entire current system. His most detailed 
proposal was that parliamentary business should be conducted in indigenous 
languages - not itself a very novel idea and equally unappealing when so few 
parliamentarians were bilingual or even understood Aymara, Quechua or 
Guarani. The precise prescriptions of Leninism had been removed from the 
socialist prospectus, but their rectilinear clumsiness was retained and simply 
given a graft of autochthonous allusion. The left appeared anachronistic and 
conservative rather than radical and innovative; its diagnosis of the country's ills 
was exceptionally broad, and it lacked precise propositions which might give it a 
more than denunciatory presence. Its only success lay in the election of 
individuals, such as Evo Morales and Juan del Granado, who had a record of 
strong personal conduct in opposition. 
Nevertheless, it is the case that, between them, the MBL and IU won over a 
quarter of the vote polled by the MNR, which received slightly more votes in 
absolute terms than in 1989 but a much reduced proportion of the total ballot. 
This was a decisive defeat for the movimientistas, whose following almost fell to 
that of the second-string parties - CONDEPA, MIR and UCS. The MNR clearly 
suffered from the now predictable 'pendulum-effect', whereby the outgoing 
administration is conclusively repudiated, as well as from direct distrust of the 
economic and administrative reforms, and possibly, through this, some recycled 
aversion to the social cost of stabilisation a dozen years earlier. In addition, the 
party's original presidential candidate, Rene Blattmann, was precipitately 
replaced by the more traditional figure of Juan Carlos Duran, who was a 
competent minister and dependable campaigner but always looked as if he was 
loyally leading the party into a period of opposition. 
The scale of the MNR's defeat in the popular vote was magnified by the 
manner in which this was converted into seats; it would seem to have suffered 
disproportionately from the introduction of the additional member system. 
Equally, it is easy to exaggerate the dimensions of the victory won by Hugo 
Banzer and the ADN, who were only narrowly ahead in a system that privileges 
marginal advantage as much as it compels coalitions. Furthermore, the ADN is 
so close to the MNR in ideological terms that it was possible for the electorate 
simultaneously to vote against the MNR and to retain its economic model.25 
Finally, of course, whilst the populist movements could amass considerable 
support, theirs remained a largely expressive politics, lacking both the 
programmatic coherence and administrative expertise to sustain a serious 
challenge for government. They still required the catalyst of an orthodox state 
manager in order to win ministries, and, as has been suggested, it is far from 
clear whether, after the death of their leaders, they can maintain momentum. 
Should one of them fail, it is doubtful that the other would automatically reap the 
benefit. The 'populist moment' may not have disappeared, but one potent 
electoral manifestation of it could well have passed. 
These factors place the ADN's victory in context, but that party itself 
25 Banzer's slogan of 'Pan, Techo, Trabajo' might sound rather corporatist, but it is a 
good deal less so than the 'Paz, Orden, Trabajo' motif he deployed 20 years earlier and 
which was reminiscent of the Petain/Laval refrain, 'Travail, Famille, Patrie'. In any event 
the ADN slogan was much snappier than that dreamt up by the MNR's spin-doctors: 
'jSoluciones de Verdad! Para una Cosecha Generosa'. 
depended heavily on the figure of Hugo Banzer Suarez, and he overcame several 
important personal obstacles to win the presidency. The first of these concerned 
the rise in nationalist sentiment that has for some time tracked the debate over 
narcotrafico, and which was particularly stoked up by the regional 'Copa de 
America' soccer championship held between the poll and the inauguration 
(Bolivia eventually being beaten into second place by Brazil despite great hopes 
of repeating the famous home victory by the 1963 national side). As a 
traditionally pro-USA soldier trained in Argentina, and as a man who had 
warmly embraced General Pinochet at Charana in 1975 in an abortive effort to 
open discussion of Bolivia's most important and contentious boundary dispute, 
Banzer was vulnerable on this front. His position was not assisted by the 
decision of Peru - at fierce odds over its border with Ecuador - to withdraw 
completely from all disputation over its southern border resulting from Chile's 
victory of the War of the Pacific (1879-84). This decision prompted the 
emergence in Bolivia of the popular saying, 'Never trust Chilean honour, 
Peruvian fraternity, or Bolivian justice', a sentiment which might not have stuck 
long in popular consciousness were it not for the high profile of the Chilean 
companies in the privatisation market. 
Reflexive patriotism found fuller expression still as a result of Bill Clinton's 
decision to lift the 20-year old US ban on advanced weaponry to the southern 
cone countries, which prompted fears of a regional arms race. The threat of 
renewed tension between Chile and Argentina, together with the revelation that 
Chile had planted hundreds of thousands of land-mines along its northern 
borders, must, of course, be seen in a post-Malvinas, as well as a (partially) post-
dictatorial and post-Communist scenario. The difference between the Bolivian 
military budget of $149 million and Chile's of $1,970 million amounts to far 
more than the cost of a proper navy; even under authoritarian regimes the 
Bolivian armed forces have never held or seriously aspired to the resources and 
status of those in Chile. It is widely accepted that access to the sea by retrieval 
(or exchange) of sovereign territory can only be gained through diplomatic 
initiative. This very recognition could have pumped up the rhetorical atmosphere 
from mid-1997, but the froideur of pronouncements - civilian and military alike 
- from Santiago might well have had something to do with Banzer's apparent 
agreement in 1978 with the Argentine high command to permit offensive 
operations across Bolivian territory into that of Chile. Whatever the case, and 
even if the new president's early waspish exchanges with the ex-leftists directing 
foreign policy in the Frei government stemmed directly from his electoral needs, 
there is reason to doubt whether the two countries will seriously seek to restore 
diplomatic relations in the short term. 
The more publicised and serious challenge faced by Banzer was that he 
authorised the killing of scores of people and violated the human rights of 
thousands under the de facto regime of 1971-78 - acts for which he remained 
unpunished; the strong implication being that he retained a vocation for 
dictatorship. This latter point was not weakened by the fact that Banzer himself 
never disputed the general existence of repressive activity and the suppression of 
civil liberties in the 1970s and had made no expression of atonement or apology 
for them; he openly argued that they had been justified by the circumstances of 
the time. However, he was evidently able to persuade nearly half a million voters 
that they could support him as a leader in a democratic system. Moreover, there 
are strong reasons for supposing that he was supported by the bulk of this 
constituency precisely as a democratic leader. That is, in terms rather distinct 
from those of his own result in 1985 or the support given to Generals Rios Montt 
in Guatemala and Pinochet in Chile. 
In the first place, the Bolivian political scenario in 1971, when Banzer took 
power, was undeniably one of social polarisation, political insurgency and the 
widespread collapse of law and order. His coup was amongst the most violent in 
national history, but it was not manifestly so because of his personal leadership. 
The subsequent regime could plausibly be presented as 'of its time', and was -
unlike Pinochet's - generally less murderous and restrictive than the coup which 
opened it. Moreover, Banzer was thrown out of office by his own peers, and was 
not subsequently seen as representing a consensus of either the officer corps or 
conservative opinion. However, it is more important that his regime was 
followed by the anarchic dictatorships of 1980-82, which exhibited a greater 
proclivity for delinquency than ideology and which went some appreciable way 
to suppressing the memory of anterior tyranny. Nothing like this, of course, 
happened in Chile, where Pinochet imposed himself upon the succeeding regime 
by constitutional fiat, whereas in Guatemala, the regime of Mejfa Victores could 
afford to be milder than that of Rfos Montt and understood the transition to 
civilian rule as an essential counter-insurgency measure. 
Thirdly, Banzer's conduct in the post-dictatorial era was exemplary. In 1982 
he had accepted the reintroduction of the 1967 Constitution and the restoration 
of the 1980 election victory of the UDP (which contained ministers from the 
Communist Party), and, as we have seen, he acquiesced in his 1985 loss of the 
congressional run-off despite winning the popular poll. In 1989 he fulfilled a 
minority role in government with sobriety, and even if he seemed to have 
decided to go into retirement, his conduct in opposition under the MNR 
administration of 1993-97 gave no cause for concern. These democratic bona 
fides had been won through a combination of high- and low-profile roles, in and 
out of office, but they had been accumulated very largely through the acceptance 
of disappointment and defeat. 
At the same time, it should be noted that General Banzer had been subjected 
to an energetic and detailed impeachment by the radical leader of the PS-1 
Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, who was assassinated in Garcia Mesa's coup of 
July 1980. The staging of that indictment, together with the failure of the 
governments of 1978-80 to proceed against the ex-president in the courts, seems 
to have bled off a portion of the earlier popular demand for a settlement of 
accounts and punishment. It stands in marked contrast to the treatment of Garcia 
Mesa, who was jailed for 30 years for political crimes committed before, during 
and after the 1980 coup. The fact that, shortly after coming to office, President 
Banzer authorised an official investigation into the killing of Marcelo Quiroga 
Santa Cruz and the whereabouts of his remains could be seen as a theatrical 
flourish and a further low-cost display of the general's lack of animus. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that at the time the sentiment was circulating 
quite widely that Banzer, having lost both his sons in accidents, had now paid a 
personal price for his own actions, whatever he said about the past and however 
genuine his avowed dedication to the rule of law. 
In short, Banzer may not have been liked or even respected, but he was no 
longer extensively distrusted or hated. It was almost as if, by osmosis, the 
Bolivian electorate discerned that to be a democrat it was not necessary to share 
ideas or values, or even to have a pleasant past; the sole requisite is that one 
accept all the rules of the game. Very often these self-same rules require -
formally or practically - a settlement of accounts over past conduct; but in 
Bolivia they were not applied to Banzer in this manner, and there is little 
expectation that they will be so. Banzer's election belies the notion that liberal 
democracy requires a consensual rewriting of history; there are absolutely no 
guarantees that it will lead to any greater social convergence (or concertacion). 
It should, instead, be viewed as the outcome of a series of tough, pragmatic 
decisions by a political society at least as mature in its calculations as some 
supposedly more sophisticated electorates. 
Che Guevara and the Importance of Historical Memory 
During the late 1970s, after the death of General Franco, a poster of Ernesto Che 
Guevara circulated in Spain on which the 'classic' heroic portrait by Alberto 
Diaz Korda was accompanied by a slogan: 'I shall return, but not as a poster'. 
This proclamation carries a strong echo of the last words attributed to Tupaj 
Amaru, executed by the Spaniards for leading the rebellion of 1781-3: 'I may 
die, but I shall return as millions'. The idea of a Pachakuti - a total cycle, 
renewal, even millennium - has particular resonance in the southern Andes, 
where it lies at the centre of a cosmovision and goes well beyond the notion of 
redemptive reincarnation of fallen heroes. These slogans were posthumously 
assigned to both men as supposed self-fulfilling prophesies, and if they possess a 
certain unsettling power in our day of quantifiable certainties, it is because they 
have not proved to be wholly false. The great insurgent leader from Cuzco had 
his name appropriated by the Uruguayan guerrillas of the 1960s and those of 
Peru in the 1980s whilst Che, of course, has never ceased to be present as more 
than an icon. Moreover, when he did finally return in material form through the 
uncovering of his skeleton near Vallegrande in July 1997, there was even a 
certain diminution in the power of that poster image. Discovery, return to Cuba 
and eventual re-interment in a pharaonic mausoleum at Santa Clara - the site of 
his greatest military victory - provided the kind of private relief and settlement 
of accounts so ardently sought by the relatives of those who have been 
'disappeared' in recent decades in Latin America. Yet it also brought the public 
Guevara down from the sphere of myth, where many had been more than happy 
to keep him. 
The fact that the discovery of Guevara's bones stemmed from the researches 
of a biographer rushing to meet a deadline that would enable publication before 
the thirtieth anniversary of his execution throws light on the forensic power of 
the contemporary chronicle.26 At the same time, however, the story of the 
exhumation occluded reappraisal of the life itself, the commemoration 
prompting celebration of a man who was heroic in the cause of a collectivist 
anti-heroism. This paradox did not stand alone; the response to the discovery of 
Che's remains excited commentary that was generally disconcerting in that -
rather like that attending the death of Princess Diana two months later - it 
revolved around the symbolism of exemplary or sacrificial spirits, wherein 
rationality stands at less than a premium. Earlier debates over the more prosaic 
contradictions of his life - those of an Argentine youth in the post-war years; of 
a franciscan lover of the good-life; of the 'straight-talker' locked into a world of 
conspiracy - were now subsumed into this grander theme. However, the 
incongruity of the pulsating commodification of such an ascetic egalitarian did 
not seem to be drawing to a close, even in the desultory effort to create a tourist 
industry around the makeshift shrine at La Higuera and the sites of the bloody 
skirmishes around it. 
In the event, most dignitaries of the continental and international left shunned 
the activities organised at Vallegrande, preferring to attend the large concerts 
and ceremonials organised in Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile as well as 
Havana. It is understandable, in simple logistical terms, why a man so dedicated 
to rural guerrilla warfare and who died in the countryside should be celebrated in 
large cities; there is no real anomaly in the 'otherness' of heroism. Equally, one 
should not be surprised that amidst all the reflections and analysis there was 
little consideration of what Guevara meant for Bolivia itself, now nearly reduced 
to that spot on the globe where an internationalist coincidentally happened to 
meet his destiny. This is not the place for a full discussion of the character of the 
anniversary of Che's death, still less the substance of his life, but a few brief 
points can be made from the perspective of Bolivia and the elections held there a 
few weeks before his exhumation. 
There is now strong evidence to suggest that Guevara had only gone to 
Bolivia in late 1966 as a step in a planned combative return to his Argentine 
homeland. It is also unlikely that his choice of this neighbouring country as a 
guerrilla site relied wholly on the advice of Regis Debray, even if his 
consultant's normalien assurance would have then seemed much less the 
construction of an idiot savant than it does today.27 Che had already been in 
Bolivia himself, on tour 13 years earlier as a recently graduated doctor and 
before he had acquired the radicalism that crystallised the following year in his 
witnessing the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala. There is, however, 
some hint of his developing attitude in a letter written to his father at the end of 
July 1953, just before the introduction of the agrarian reform which at the time 
provided a sharp sense of the weakness of the state but would later prove to be a 
26 Jon Lee Anderson (1997) Che Guevara. A Revolutionary Life (London: Bantam). 
27 Regis Debray (1968) Revolution in the Revolution? (London: Penguin); James 
Dunkerley (1992) Barrientos and Debray: All Gone or More to Come? (London: 
Institute of Latin American Studies, Occasional Paper no. 2). 
critical dyke against social radicalism: 
I am a little disillusioned about not being able to stay here because this is a 
very interesting country and it is living through a particularly effervescent 
moment. On the 2nd of August the agrarian reform goes through, and fracas 
and fights are expected throughout the country. We have seen incredible 
processions of armed people with Mausers and Tommy-guns, which they 
shoot off for the hell of it. Every day shots can be heard and there are 
wounded and dead as a result. 
The government shows a near-total inability to retain or lead the peasant 
masses and miners, but these respond to a certain degree, and there is no 
doubt that in the event of an armed revolt by the Falange...they will be on the 
side of the MNR. Human life has little importance here, and it is given and 
taken without great to-do. All of this makes this a profoundly interesting 
situation to the neutral observer.'28 
In the light of this, it is tempting to read much into Che's visit, on the day of 
the agrarian reform, to the Bolsa Negra mine outside La Paz. The miners had, 
quite naturally, taken the day off work to go to town and participate in the 
celebrations with campesino contingents (the reform was formally signed by 
Victor Paz at Ucurena, Cochabamba). Having toured the silent shafts of Bolsa 
Negra, Che passed the returning miners on his way back to the city, again being 
impressed by the explosions of dynamite and discharge of guns. It strikes one as 
particularly odd that during his month in the country the young Argentine should 
have contrived to miss both the agrarian reform celebrations and the 
extraordinary experience of Bolivia's proletariat in its Andean engagement. 
Indeed, this failed rendez-vous might be interpreted as reflecting less a proclivity 
to favour the rural over the urban than a general clumsiness when it came to 
'being there'. Certainly, in 1966-7 Guevara categorically misjudged the mood, 
social resource and political capacity of both rural and industrial working 
people. In itself this probably did not cost him his life, but the lack of sensitivity 
and sobriety in assessing local detail always meant that escape was the best 
outcome awaiting the guerrillas. 
By 1997 the social constituency (the 'big motor') that Che's foco (the little 
motor') was intended to ignite had been scattered by a comprehensive 
deindustrialisation and the dismantling of the corporatist institutions of the 
1950s. The miners are now numbered in their hundreds, the confused COB is 
split over the degree of collaboration it should offer the new Banzer government, 
and Mario Monje, the Communist leader who once disputed Che's appropriation 
of the radical vanguard in Bolivia, lives out an isolated old age on the outskirts 
of Moscow. Yet the overall picture is far from clear. Banzer's insistent refusal in 
public to treat Guevara's endeavour as anything more than a red invasion 
appeared backward-looking and ungenerous; it was not widely echoed, even in 
conservative circles. Nor did the government's ostentatious listing of the 54 
soldiers and civilians killed by the guerrillas and declared heroes in 1967 strike a 
chord of anything but sadness. In keeping with the nature of Banzer's own 
28 Quoted in Anderson, Che Guevara, p. 104. 
election a few weeks earlier, there was a marked lack of adversarialism in the 
political atmosphere (in November Fidel Castro did not hesitate to stand next to 
Banzer for the photo-call at the Seventh Ibero-American summit in Venezuela). 
A similar mood appears to have prevailed in Buenos Aires and Santiago; an 
epoch had passed, and if Che was returning, it was not as an exemplar of a 
precise form of insurgency but as the embodiment of higher values and ideals. 
In Vallegrande and the village of La Higuera, where he was shot, Che is 
evidently more than a celebrity. Elsewhere in the country he might be said no 
longer to be an 'outsider', a source of embarrassment (or pride) in that he was 
killed in Bolivia. Perhaps Banzer's observations found scant response because 
Guevara was now seen less as an internationalist fighting against global reaction 
in a local setting than as somebody who had misconstrued the nature of 
nationalism in Bolivia - who had made a specific mistake in interpreting the 
country. In this he might almost be described as truer to his origins as an 
Argentine than to his mature convictions as a Communist. Furthermore, one 
gains the sense from a longer historical perspective that whilst the 1966-7 
guerrilla never came to pose a serious threat of ideological conquest, it did raise 
fears of dismemberment of a type wearily familiar to a populace well schooled 
about the reduction of their national territory through wars - that of the Pacific 
(1879-84); in Acre (1899-1901); and in the Chaco (1932-5) - in addition to cut-
price sales to Chile and Brazil by the likes of President Melgarejo. These 
experiences have been the traumatic testing-grounds for any logic that might lie 
behind the existence of a country deemed by some - not least Chilean generals 
and US diplomats - to have nurtured too many problems to be worthy of 
existence. This existence may have been upheld on the simple grounds that no 
neighbour has historically sought outright conquest and merely opted for 
maximum annexation of land with lowest social intake, but the state now 
confronts a new challenge in the integration of regional markets, particularly 
through Mercosur, of which Bolivia is an associate member. 
These circumstances go some way to explaining why so much controversy 
should be aroused in the weeks around the 1997 election by the publication of a 
work of amateur history, La Mesa Coja by Javier Mendoza.29 Making extensive 
use of the notes of his father, the great archivist Gunnar Mendoza, the author 
proposed that one of the founding documents of the nation - the 1809 
proclamation of the Junta Tuitiva in La Paz - was not, in fact, signed or even 
composed by the members of that body, as had widely been believed for 150 
years. Rather, according to Mendoza's methodological mix of strong 
documentary deduction and psychological induction, that document was a later 
'creation'/forgery, and the real original derived from dissident jurists and priests 
in Chuquisaca (Sucre), who had far greater need and desire to form a state 
independent of Peru and the Viceroyality of La Plata than did the merchants of 
La Paz. In effect, Mendoza was revindicating the place of Sucre as the capital of 
the nation, impugning paceno claims to have promoted the birth of the nation, 
29 Javier Mendoza Pizarro (1997) La Mesa Coja. Historia de la Proclama de la Junta 
Tuitiva del 16 de Julio de 1809 (La Paz and Sucre: PIEB). 
and reviving a debate which was widely thought moribund because it had no 
contemporary relevance. 
The exchanges over this issue combined a ferocious abandonment of 
common sense by traditionalist politicians with a pained reservation on the part 
of professional historians, for whom Mendoza's approach was too glib by half. 
But all participants passed without comment over the critical point that -
whoever might have been responsible for the start of the independence struggle 
- it was completed by a Colombian (Sucre) assisted by two Irishmen (O'Leary 
and O'Connor), a German (Braun) and an Englishman (Miller) in the execution 
of a strategic plan drawn up by a Venezuelan (Bolivar). This internationalist 
presence at the very origin of the state has always been the source of some 
ambivalence. However, modern nationalists may find some solace in a sentiment 
expressed by Bolivar to Santander in a letter of October 1825, on his first and 
only visit to the country just named after him: 'if Brazil invades, I will fight as a 
Bolivian - a name I had before I was born'.30 
Simon Bolivar accepted the existence of Bolivia, and probably for better 
cause than on account of it bearing his name; and he did so despite the fact that 
its establishment created another obstacle to his federalist design for the 
subcontinent - an objective and idiom so similar to those of Guevara. Moreover, 
it could be argued that Bolivar's secular, militarist republicanism savoured very 
much of that practised by Che 135 years later. Neither man would surely have 
much difficulty in interpreting the election of 1997 in the terms of their day. For 
Bolivar, Banzer's election does not quite vindicate his 1826 'Message to the 
Assembly of Bolivia', but it could be recognised as the intervention of a caudillo 
to sort out the politica criolla of the lawyers and harness their disputations to the 
higher needs of the nation. For Che, the campaign would surely have amounted 
to little more than the squabbles of temporising liberals at the service of US 
imperialism as they extinguish the depleted legitimacy won in 1952. However, 
one suspects that neither man would fully grasp how and why many Bolivians 
could both concur with these assessments and yet still place such a politics 
above the emphatic pursuit of Utopia to which these two historic 'extra-
Bolivians' were pledged. 
30 Bolivar, Potosi, 21 Oct. 1825, to Santander, see H. Bierck and V. Lecuna (eds.) (1951) 
Selected Writings of Bolivar II (New York: Colonial Press ), p. 543. 

